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Securing Transnational Corporate
Accountability Through National Courts:
Inplications and Policy Options
BY HALINA WARD*

Introduction
A majority of the papers in this volume consider the direct
responsibilities of corporations under international law, for example
at domestic level through liability under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims
Act, or at international level in human rights tribunals. This paper
takes a different starting point, namely the increasing trend for parent
companies of multinational corporate groups to face litigation in
developed country courts over environmental, social and human
rights impacts in developing countries.
Not every case in this new wave of legal actions raises issues
about the scope of corporate responsibilities under principles of
international law. But in each, questions are raised about the
contribution of existing legal frameworks and the adequacy of
existing legal principles, at the domestic level, as a vehicle for
determining the complex issues of transnational corporate
accountability that lie at the heart of the contemporary "corporate
citizenship" agenda.
The term "corporate citizenship"1 runs the risk of being all things
* LL.M. (Law and Development), Solicitor, Director, Corporate Responsibility
for Environment and Development, International Institute for Environment and

Development, London, U.K. (as of October 2001). This paper is based on a Briefing

Paper published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in February, 2001
(New Series No. 18), titled Governing Multinationals: The Role of Foreign Direct

Liability. At the time of writing, the author was Senior Research Fellow, Energy and
Environment Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, U.K.

1. The terms "corporate citizenship" and "corporate social responsibility" or
even "corporate responsibility" are often used interchangeably. Here, the term
"corporate citizenship" is used throughout, particularly to underline that the kind of
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to all people. But in essence corporate citizenship embodies a call to
understand business as part of society, contributing directly to the
welfare of society, rather than somehow separate from it. Corporate
citizenship invites companies to make strategic choices based on an
understanding of the total impact of their business in society.2
Placing centre stage the question of corporate citizenship and the
role of law and litigation in securing it invites a broader perspective
than a focus on the application of international law to corporations.
It reveals many more obstacles to tailored policy change for the
future, whilst indicating some possible directions for policy initiatives
at a variety of levels.

I. Globalization, Corporate Responsibility and
the New Challenges of Corporate Governance
The corporate citizenship agenda itself is closely linked to the
globalization debate. Understanding the context for the new wave of
transnational litigation points first to consideration of that link.
Economic globalization-the linked processes of trade and
investment liberalization, privatization and deregulation-has
brought huge increases in movements of capital, goods and services.
Multinational corporations are the vehicles for much of this
globalized economic activity, and in turn, foreign direct investment by
multinational corporations accounts for an increasing proportion of
global economic activity. UNCTAD's 1999 World Investment Repor?
estimated the total number of parent corporations worldwide at
almost 60,000, with over half a million foreign affiliates. The question
of how best to manage the environmental and social impacts of
foreign direct investment by these multinational, transnationally
coordinated economic networks is becoming ever more pressing.
The overall relationship between foreign direct investment and
environmental protection and human development is not easy to
assess. Multinational corporations have the option of deliberately
corporate responsibility at stake is not limited to consideration of social impacts.
Environmental and human rights impacts also form part of the corporate citizenship
agenda.
2. HALINA WARD,
ROYAL
INSTITUTE
OF
INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
CONFERENCE REPORT, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, (2000) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES].
3. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1999: FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc.

UNCTADiWIR/1999, U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.3 (1999).
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taking advantage of lower environmental or social standards or weak
systems of governance in developing countries. But they can also
export "best practice" and bring badly needed jobs and development.
On the environment side, the only clear overall message from
empirical work to date is that foreign direct investment can have both
negative and positive impacts From a sectoral human development
perspective, evidence is emerging that in a number of poor but oilrich developing countries, UNDP Human Development Index
rankings have fallen as oil revenues have increased
Globalization has given rise to new demands on corporations to
exercise their power responsibly. Critics of economic globalization
charge that economic power brings political power and that the world
is witnessing increasing power imbalances between multinational
corporations-particularly large ones-and nations.6
Some
international NGOs have focused in on this, demanding that
companies investing in politically unstable economies, such as the
Sudan, should use their influence to encourage host country
governments to respect human rights and to spend the revenue that
their investments generate for social benefit-not to wage wars or
line the pockets of political elites.'
Some proponents of corporate citizenship in the North see it as a
way of countering the ongoing backlash against globalization; a way
to reinvigorate the notion that trade and investment can bring overall
social and environmental welfare gains.
Encouraging global
corporate responsibility then becomes part of efforts to put "a human
face on the global economy." Globalization, it has been suggested,
exerts a transformative effect on corporate responsibility-turning it
from a choice into an imperative. 8
However one views the links between the economic might of
corporations and political power, it is certainly the case that the
4. See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
FOREIGN DIRECr INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1999).
5. E.g., ECON CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND FRIDTJOF NANSEN
INSTITUTE, ECON REPORT No. 62/2000, FNI REPORT No. 11/2000, PETRO-STATES PREDATORY OR DEVELOPMENTAL?

6. See generally JOSHuA

(2000).

KARLINER, THE CORPORATE PLANET: ECOLOGY AND

POLITICS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

(1997).

7. See, e.g., Christian Aid, The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan, available
at http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/0103suda/sudanoil.htm (last visited Aug.
27, 2001).
8. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting Bennett Freeman,

U.S. State Department).
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governance challenge that is now presented by multinational
corporations is global. In a world struggling to find new ways of
achieving global cooperation, the mechanisms of national policy and
intergovernmental cooperation are poorly suited to governing
multinationals in a way that matches the reality of transnationally
coordinated economic networks. National governments are tied to
domestic policy constituents and constrained by the need not to
impinge on other countries' sovereignty.
One expression of the new dilemmas of global governance can be
found in a call, expressed through transnational litigation, for home
countries to accept increased responsibility for regulating the negative
extraterritorial impacts of multinational corporate groups. That this
should happen is not surprising-it is in itself a reflection of the
globalization process.
H. The Contemporary Foreign Direct Liability Agenda
Courts in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and
Australia have been asked to deal with a new wave of claims that aim
to hold parent companies legally accountable for negative
environmental, health and safety, labour, or human rights impacts
associated with the operations of members of their corporate family
in developing countries. These claims represent the flip side of
foreign direct investment-"foreign direct liability." The foreign
direct liability cases complement campaigners' calls for minimum
standards for multinational corporations by testing the boundaries of
existing legal principles.
An overview of a selection of the key cases is included in Box 1.
Typically, actions are brought by foreign workers or residents of
communities harmed by mining, oil or gas extraction, or chemicals
manufacturing. On occasion, litigation has been initiated by host
country governments on behalf of their injured citizens. Sometimes,
the cases involve host country state-owned enterprises acting through
joint ventures with foreign investors, but the litigation is not
intergovernmental as such. Even in cases where the impacts under
consideration include transboundary environmental harm, foreign
direct liability potentially offers a way to apportion responsibility
among private actors, rather than between governments on the basis
of their international legal responsibilities.
With the exception of one action brought in Quebec against a
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Canadian corporation registered in Montreal,9 all of the claims so far
have been brought in common law jurisdictions. The established
legal cultural links between Anglo-Saxon lawyers and procedural
rules, such as those that determine what defendants have to disclose
in litigation, may be contributory factors. But for the longer term it is
not unlikely, as legal practitioners' understanding of the relevant
principles of law evolves, that cases will emerge in the civil law
systems of European Union (EU) member states such as the
Netherlands or France.
There are two main types of legal action:
* The first focuses on corporate compliance with norms of
international law. The locus is the United States, and the
Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 (ATCA). The ATCA gives
district courts power to hear civil claims by foreign citizens
for injuries that are caused by actions "in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." Before the
1980s, courts had restricted the uses of the statute, so that
foreigners were prevented from bringing actions against their
own officials in U.S. courts. But by 1997, the case law had
clearly established that the statute could potentially cover not
only foreign officials but also claims against private
individuals for injuries resulting from atrocities committed in
pursuit of genocide or war crimes. And, in 1997, the plaintiff
in an action against Freeport-McMoran over the impacts of
its copper, gold, and silver mine in Irian Jaya succeeded in
establishing that corporations could be liable under the Alien
Tort Claims Act." Shortly afterwards, in a separate action
against Unocal Corp.," a U.S. district court held that the

9. Recherches Internationales Quebec v. Cambior Inc., [1998] Q.J. No. 2554,
para. 82 (Quebec Super. Ct. Aug. 14,1998) (unedited judgment).
10. Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing MultinationalCorporations in the U.S. for Violating
InternationalLaw, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 109 (1999) (discussing

Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997)).
11. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). In September 2000,
the same district court granted Unocal's application to reject the Alien Tort Claims
Act claim on the basis that it disclosed no cause of action. Nonetheless, the court's
order noted that the evidence suggested Unocal knew that forced labour was being
used and that the joint venturers benefited from the practice. The decision was
appealed. At the time of writing a decision is still awaited. However, on March 5,
2001, the court ordered that separate claims initiated in September 2000 under state
law could continue. For information on the case, see http://www.laborrights.org (last
updated Aug. 31,2001).
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statute potentially covered litigation against oil companies
which were said to have conspired or acted in partnership
with the Myanmar government to violate international law,
including through the use of forced labour to build a gas
pipeline. That action is still being pursued.
A second kind of litigation has been seen in Canada, England
and Australia, as well as the United States. Rather than
focusing on corporate compliance with fundamental human
rights, it relates more closely to an NGO campaign call for
parent companies of multinational corporate groups to
ensure that their behaviour as direct investors in other
countries matches standards of care that would be expected
at home. U.S. courts hosted unsuccessful litigation against
Union Carbide following the 1984 Bhopal disaster. 3 In
Canada, Quebec mining company Cambior faced litigation
over pollution from its gold mine in Guyana; in Australia the
company BHP faces claims arising out of pollution in Papua
New Guinea. In England, actions have been brought against
Rio Tinto (at the time still known as RTZ) arising out of
working conditions at its Rossing Uranium Mine in Namibia;
against former asbestos mining company Cape in respect of
its operations in South Africa; and against Thor Chemicals
over mercury poisoning suffered by workers at its South
African mercury recycling plant. The facts presented by the
Thor Chemicals case are summarized in Box 2. They are
particularly striking in that they closely match NGO concerns
about corporate exploitation of weak governance or lower
penalties in developing countries.
Box 1: Overview of Selected Actions
United States
The Indian government's attempt to sue Union Carbide in the
United States following the Bhopal disaster failed on the grounds
that the action should have been brought in India, not the United
12. A series of actions has also been brought by Holocaust survivors against
Japanese, Austrian, German, and U.S. corporations accused of using slave labour

during the Second World War. These actions, which have little direct linkage to the

contemporary corporate citizenship agenda, are not considered further here.
13. See generally P.T. Muchlinski, The Bhopal Case: Controlling Ultrahazardous
IndustrialActivities Undertaken by ForeignInvestors, 50 MODERN L.R. 545 (1987).
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States.
"

A series of actions under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 against
U.S.-domiciled parent companies is under way. Some actions focus
squarely on alleged corporate involvement in human rights abuses
(e.g. Unocal in Myanmar, or Chevron in Nigeria). Others have a
strong environmental dimension (e.g. Texaco in Ecuador).

*

A distinct set of actions has been brought against non-U.S. parent
companies. A key issue in these cases is whether they have
sufficient business presence in the United States for a U.S. court to
exercise jurisdiction over them. Examples include ongoing actions
against Shell (over operations in Nigeria), Total (over operations in
Myanmar) and Rio Tinto (over operations in Bougainville).

Englandand Wales
" The House of Lords decided in 1997 that Edward Connelly,
formerly a worker at the Rossing Uranium Mine in Namibia, a Rio
Tinto subsidiary, could sue in England for damages for personal
injuries. The action later failed on the basis that it had been
initiated outside the limitation period allowed by law.
" The House of Lords decided in July 2000 that some 3,000 South
African citizens suffering from asbestosis and mesothelioma could
continue to bring an action in England against Cape PLC, an
England-based company formerly with South African asbestos
mining interests.
*

Three separate actions against English chemical company Thor
Chemicals by former workers at a South African mercury recycling
plant were ultimately settled out of court. Two were settled in 1997
and the third was settled in 2000.

Quebec
An action against Canadian gold mining company Cambior arising
out of environmental pollution following the collapse of a tailings
dam in Guyana failed in 1998 on the basis that Guyana was a more
appropriate legal forum.
Australia
Litigation was started in 1994 against Broken Hill Proprietary by
people living around the Ok Tedi River in Papua New Guinea.
They claimed damages for pollution as a result of the collapse of a
tailings dam from a copper mine. An out-of-court settlement was
ultimately reached, but new litigation was initiated in Australia in
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2000 based on claims that pollution was continuing and that the
settlement had been breached.
*

A 1998 court judgment refused to hold an Australian parent
company, James Hardie, liable for asbestosis suffered by an
employee at its New Zealand subsidiary, on the basis that the
parent's separate legal identity prevented the imposition of a duty of
care under the law of negligence.

Box 2: The Thor Chemicals Litigation
Thor Chemicals manufactured and reprocessed mercury-based
chemicals in England until its business in Margate came under criticism,
over a considerable period, from the Health and Safety Executive, in the
1980s.a
The claimants' case was based on the suggestion that
subsequently, around 1986, the parent company relocated the
reprocessing plant-including some of the machinery-to South Africa,
establishing a plant in Natal as a wholly-owned subsidiary. The
chairman of the parent company was employed by the South African
subsidiary to design and set up the infrastructure of the new
reprocessing plant.
Workers with high levels of mercury in their blood and urine were
apparently laid off or sent to work in the gardens until their mercury
levels had decreased.b
A 'successful criminal prosecution in South
Africa following the deaths of three workers led to a US$3700equivalent fine.
In 1994, the first of a series of actions was begun against the
company and its chairman (now the only director) in the English High
Court. The plaintiffs argued that the parent company and its chairman
should be held liable because they were directly responsible for setting
up and maintaining factories in South Africa which they knew, or ought
to have known, would be unsafe for the people who worked in them.'
The first and second of the actions, involving a total of twenty
workers, were ultimately settled out of court in April 1997 for £1.3
million. A third, which was begun in 1998 on behalf of an additional
twenty-one workers, settled out of court in October 2000 for £270,000."
a. Richard Meeran, Accountability of Transnationalsfor Human Rights
Abuses-I, 148 NEw L.J. 1686 (1998).
b. Richard Meeran, Thor Workers Accept Offer of Settlement, at
http://www.labournet.net/world/0010/thor2.html (Oct. 10, 2000).
c. Sithole v. Thor Chems. Holdings Ltd., official transcript (Eng. C.A.
Feb. 3, 1999) (on file with author).
d. Meeran, supra note b.
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Leaving aside the special situation offered by the ATCA in the
United States, plaintiffs' lawyers have to choose carefully how to
frame their case. In simple terms, the risks of liability are likely to
increase the closer a parent company gets to day-to-day control of
associated companies or subsidiaries. But the cases are legally
controversial for many reasons, not least because they go against the
grain of the idea that different companies in the same multinational
group must be treated as separate legal entities-a principle that
makes it difficult as a matter of law to hold a parent company
responsible for acts or omissions of a subsidiary. An Australian
judgment presents the stark reality particularly clearly: "The law pays
scant regard to the commercial reality that every holding company
has the potential [to] and, more often than not, in fact, does, exercise
complete control over the subsidiary."14
A second major point of controversy is that because courts are
public rather than private actors, foreign direct liability can generate
foreign policy tensions. The fundamental principle of territorial
sovereignty underpins the right of host countries to regulate impacts
and activities in their territory and prevents other states from
interfering. When in 1993 an ATCA case was brought against Texaco
in the United States by Ecuadorian indigenous people living in a
remote area of the Ecuadorian Amazon, the then Ecuadorian
Ambassador to the United States lodged a diplomatic protest. He
claimed that the action was an affront to Ecuador's national
sovereignty, that Ecuador had a paramount interest in formulating its
own environmental and industrial policies, and that Ecuador's courts
were open to adjudicate such disputes." From a business perspective,
too, there is opposition on the basis that the cases amount to
politically motivated attempts to shut down natural resource
development, using the courts to bypass traditional political and
economic structures. 6 In contrast, in the Cape litigation, the South

14. Briggs v. James Hardie & Co., (1989) 16 N.S.W.L.R. 549,577.
15. See Judith Kimerling, Oil, Lawlessness and Indigenous Struggles in Ecuador's

Oriente, in GREEN GUERILLAS: ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS AND INITIATIVES IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 61 (Helen Collinson ed., 1996). This position
was subsequently reversed with a change of government.
PEOPLE V.
16. JOHN C. REYNOLDS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
DEVELOPMENT: HUMAN RIGHTS MASS TORT LITIGATION AND INTERNATIONAL
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT (2000) (presented at 8th Section Fall Meeting, Sept. 20-24,

2000).
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African government intervened on the side of the plaintiffs, with its
lawyers arguing explicitly that "the Republic of South Africa sees no
South African public interest in requiring its courts to adjudicate in a
dispute which arises from alleged acts of an English company under
the laws of the old South Africa."'7
Plaintiffs' lawyers often seek to reduce the potential for company
law or foreign policy tensions by focusing on decisions or actions of
the parent company itself, not the scope of parents' responsibilities
for the acts or omissions of their subsidiaries.'8 The key to resolving
both these potential tensions of foreign direct liability claims within
the existing legal framework lies in recognizing that most of the cases

concern the responsibilities of parent companies themselves. The
English cases against Cape and Thor Chemicals, for example, have
effectively been based on an argument that the parent company's
involvement in the day-to-day management of the relevant overseas
facility was such that it should be directly responsible and liable under
the law of negligence for injuries sustained as a consequence of
operations technically carried on by another company in the group.
But where the cases stray too close to consideration of host country
policies, they can force courts into making difficult, highly politicized
judgments.
A variety of legal hurdles need to be overcome if a foreign
plaintiff is to bring a successful foreign direct liability claim against a
parent company on account of environment or health and safety
impacts or involvement in human rights abuses in other countries.
Before plaintiffs can get into the substantive issues, they are likely to
face claims by the defendant parent company to the effect that the
action has been brought in the wrong forum-in other words, that the
country where the injuries occurred is the more appropriate place to
bring the action. The legal doctrine that is applied to arrive at a legal
answer to these sorts of claims in the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia is called forum non conveniens. In essence,
the doctrine allows a court to refuse to hear a case where there is
another legal forum available "in which the case may be tried more
suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice."' 9
17. Statement of Case on Behalf of the Republic of South Africa (May 26, 2000),
in Lubbe v. Cape PLC, 1 W.L.R. 1545 (2000) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.) (on file
with author).
18. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 121.
19. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1987] A.C. 460, 476 (H.L. 1986)
(appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
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Under English case law, this test will not be met where "substantial
justice cannot be done in the appropriate forum,"'2 a determination
that can take courts into politically sensitive decisions about
administration of justice in host countries.
In the United Kingdom, access to justice has been impeded by
uncertainty over the proper boundaries of the forum non conveniens
principle-uncertainty that has proved a distraction from the real
issues of substance in foreign direct liability cases, namely the extent
of parent company responsibility.
In the EU, a coordinated system for deciding issues of
jurisdiction already exists under the Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters. It establishes a general principle that defendants can be
sued in the courts of the EU member state in which they are
domiciled. In the past, English courts have chosen not to apply the
principle when the alternative court is in a non-EU country. The
reason for doing so, however, is particularly weak in cases where the
substance of a plaintiff's claim is that the parent company itself, by its
own direct acts or omissions, should be responsible for injuries
suffered in another country. But following a ruling of the European
Court of Justice in July 2000, just one week before the House of
Lords judgment in the Cape litigation, it seems clear that this English
approach has been wrong as a matter of European law. In Group Josi
Reinsurance Company SA v. Universal General Insurance Company
(UGIC), a reinsurance case referred to the European Court of Justice
by a French Court of Appeal, the Court ruled that the general
principle on jurisdiction
is in principle applicable where the defendant has its domicile or
seat in a Contracting State, even if the plaintiff is domiciled in a
non-member country. It would be otherwise only in exceptional
cases where an express provision of that convention provides that
the application of the rule of jurisdiction which it sets out 2is

dependent on the plaintiff's domicile being in a Contracting State. 1
The case spells the death of the forum non conveniens principle in
foreign direct liability cases involving defendant companies domiciled
20. Connelly v. R.T.Z. Corp., [1998] A.C. 854, 873 (H.L. 1997) (appeal taken
from Eng. C.A.); see also SpiliadaMaritime, [1987] A.C. at 478.
21. Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. SA v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co.,
Judgment (Ct. of Justice of the European Communities July 13, 2000), available at

http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/act/0022en.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 24:451

in England and Wales.
In environmental cases brought under the Alien Tort Claims
Act, a further complication arises in that there is little consensus over
the legal status of key international environmental law principles, or
specifically "environmental" human fights, such as the right to a
healthy environment. Scholars and judges differ in their views on the
extent to which these relatively new principles may have acquired the
acceptance necessary to crystallize into principles of customary
international law, let alone whether they amount to norms of the kind
envisaged under the Alien Tort Claims Act. So far, none of the cases
has succeeded in persuading a U.S. court that environmental damage
can form the basis of a claim under the ATCA. This particular
difficulty does not arise in ATCA cases based on abuses of
established human rights such as torture or forced labour. But even
then, no clear conclusions can be drawn on which international legal
obligations do not require state action to found a claim under the
ATCA or, where other international legal obligations are at stake, on
precisely what kinds of corporate acts or omissions fall within the
"colour of law" doctrine under which private actors may nonetheless
be held accountable for the purposes of the ATCA.
Further hurdles arise at the stages at which courts are invited to
consider the substantive issues and have to decide which country's
law applies to the substance of the case and the size of any eventual
damages award. It is possible for the law of the host country to be
applied to the substantive issues, and the law of the home country to
decide procedural questions or levels of damages.
So far, not one of the major foreign direct liability cases has
resulted in a clear win for the plaintiffs on the substantive issues,
though some cases (those against Thor Chemicals in the United
Kingdom) have been settled out of court.
1I. Why is Foreign Direct Liability Happening?
If establishing responsibility is such a lottery, why are the foreign
direct liability claims being brought?
Governance deficits in host countries, substantive differences
between legal systems, the possibility of higher damages awards being
awarded in home rather than host countries, and innovative strategies
on the part of plaintiffs' lawyers all play a role in the emergence of
foreign direct liability cases. The point of principle where an action is
brought in a parent company's place of domicile is that since the case
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concerns the acts or omissions of the parent itself, it should be
possible to bring the action against the parent in its home country,
rather than where the impacts occurred. In any event, the company
may no longer have any presence in the host country where the
impacts are felt. Cape PLC, for example, had ceased to have any
South African interests at all by 1989, so there was no prospect of
pursuing an action in South Africa before the company had indicated
that it was prepared to make itself available there.'
Most of the foreign direct liability cases raise issues about
governance in host countries. In some, a risk of persecution or of
human rights abuses make it impossible for plaintiffs to seek redress
at home. There may, as in the litigation against Texaco Inc. arising
out of its operations in Ecuador,' be real concerns about corruption,
or that host country courts could not be impartial, particularly when
host country government agencies are themselves directly involved in
the relevant operations as business partners. In other cases, a lack of
financial or legal resources in host countries makes pursuit of a host
country action a theoretical possibility only. This was effectively the
conclusion of the House of Lords in separate actions in the United
Kingdom against Rio Tinto and Cape PLC.
Simple lack of capacity in the administration of justice in host
countries can present formidable obstacles too. The U.S. litigation
against Texaco, originating in its activities in Ecuador, potentially
22. By the time the Cape litigation came before the United Kingdom House of
Lords on the issue of forum non conveniens, Cape had given an undertaking that it
would make itself available to be sued in South Africa, and that it would not argue
against South Africa as the choice of legal forum if the action were pursued there.
See Lubbe, 1 W.L.R. 1545, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/ldl99900/ldjudgmt/jdOO0720/lubbe-l.htm (July 20,2000).
23. In January 2000, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York ordered that the parties and the Government of Ecuador should have a
renewed opportunity to make submissions on whether the courts of Ecuador and
Peru "might reasonably be expected to exercise a modicum of independence and

impartiality if these cases were dismissed in contemplation of being refiled in one or
both of those forums." Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,
2000) (mem. order), available at http:lwww.texaco.comlshared/positionldocs/aquindjota.doc (last visited Aug. 31, 2001). The order followed what the court described as
a "military coup" in Ecuador on January 21, 2000, when the president was replaced
by the elected vice president. Id. The judge consulted the latest available U.S. State

Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Ecuador, published in
February 1999. Id. He cited a primary conclusion of that report that "[t]he most
fundamental human rights abuse [in Ecuador] stems from shortcomings in [its]
politicized, inefficient, and corrupt legal and judicial system," and emphasized that
the statements in the report were made before the January 2000 coup. Ld.
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involves up to 30,000 plaintiffs. Ecuadorian law does not offer any
special process for dealing with group actions of this kind.' The court
in Ecuador, where any case would be heard, is located in the
Amazonian oil town of Lago Agrio. According to a 1994 affidavit
filed in support of the plaintiffs' claim,' the court is ten hours' drive
from Quito. The one civil judge lives in Quito and works in Lago
Agrio two to four days a week. The courtroom is an office fifteen
feet by ten feet and doubles as the judge's chambers.
The role of public interest lawyers undoubtedly also plays a part
in driving foreign direct liability. Many of the plaintiffs' lawyers are
employed by charitable organizations that receive support for their
work from major foundations and see their work as part of broader
efforts to strengthen the accountability of multinational corporate
groups. Others work for profit-making law firms that take on cases
with a strong public interest element, often on a "no win no fee"
basis, working to establish remedies for plaintiffs who would
otherwise not be compensated for their injuries.
IV. Why Do the Cases Deserve Attention?
If so little has happened in the foreign direct liability cases so far,
why should the relative handful of actions be of any concern, and to
whom?
The bottom line for companies is that share prices respond even
to the threat of liability. Following the House of Lords judgment in
the Cape litigation on July 20, 2000, Cape's shares dropped sharply on
the London Stock Exchange. By mid-afternoon on the day of the
judgment, they were trading at £0.405, compared to a £0.550 close on
the previous day.2
Many of the cases in the United Kingdom, United States and
Australia have received broad press attention,27 reinforcing the

24. Norman Wray, Center for Economic and Social Rights, Texaco Document
(Dec. 7-8, 2000) (citing affidavit of Alberto Wray in Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.)
(unpublished workshop paper, on file with author).
25. Affidavit
of Steven Donziger
(Mar.
7,
1994), available at
http://www.texacorainforest.org/case/donziger.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).
26. Amy Musgrave & Mariette le Roux, South Africans Applaud Asbestos
Ruling,
INDEP.
ONLINE
(S.
Afr.),
July
20,
2000,
at
http://www.iol.co.za/html/frame-news.php?art-id=qw964102383774B263 (last visited
Aug. 31, 2001).
27. These cases have received attention not only in broadsheet newspapers, but
also other media, including the United Kingdom's satirical magazine Private Eye,
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potential adverse reputational impacts of the judgments themselves.
Liability is a leveller-not only because it can reach companies
that do not have highly visible brands, but also because what really
counts in court in foreign direct liability actions is real impacts on the
ground, not what a company claims to be doing. Litigation can flush
out revealing internal company documents that can trigger public
censure, even if not legal accountability. The foreign direct liability'
cases can uncover embarrassing mismatches between what companies
choose to say they aspire to, and what the legal evidence suggests
actually happens on the ground.
In reporting on its "ethics and values," Unocal's website includes
a statement that the company will "respect human rights in all its
activities."" But the reality of the company's minority investment in
the Yadana gas field in Myanmar suggests, at the very least, that the
company's vision of what is necessitated by this aspiration is quite
different from the expectations of many civil society actors. In the
ongoing Alien Tort Claims Act litigation against Unocal Corp.
alleging conspiracy or partnership in human rights abuses by the
Myanmar military around the Yadana gas field, the evidence included.
a 1996 communication from an employee of Total (one of Unocal's
joint venture partners and the project operator) to Unocal, which
stated "About forced labour used by the troops assigned to provide
security on our pipeline project, let us admit between Unocal and
'
Total that we might be in a grey zone."29

Linked closely to these considerations is the fact that the cases
have direct links to the broad civil society agenda on globalization
and corporate responsibility. In the United Kingdom for example,
the NGOs Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) and the World
Development Movement have both campaigned around the litigation
against Cape and Thor Chemicals, and ACTSA has brought plaintiffs
in the Cape litigation to the United Kingdom to speak at public
meetings, and to meet company shareholders and directors." But it is
which in March 2001 carried a piece reporting the emergence of documents said to
reveal Cape's knowledge of the risks that its mines posed to workers and residents.
See PRIVATE EYE, Mar. 9-22,2001.

28. Unocal
Statement
of
Principles,
available
at
http://www.unocal.comlresponsibility/princip.htm (last visited Aug. 31,2001).
29. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1302 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting
letter from Herve Chagnoux, Total employee, to Unocal).
30. ACTSA Briefing, Apartheid's Killer Legacy, April 2001, available at
http://www.actsa.org/cape__apart.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).
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also important to recognize that foreign direct liability claims are one
way among many of pursuing corporate responsibility, including
social and environmental auditing, stock exchange listing and
disclosure requirements, minority shareholder resolutions by
concerned individuals or organizations, or pressure on investment
funds to withdraw support for recalcitrant companies.
Nongovernmental organizations are active in all these areas.
The threat of liability has the potential to be a powerful
motivator of business change. A single successful foreign direct
liability case would likely trigger a raft of risk management thinking
not only among internal company managers, but also within the
insurance industry, lenders and investors. Just one or two successful
cases could lead to a wave of copycat litigation. Law, so long as its
content is sufficiently clear, can be a more effective driver of change
than voluntary initiatives that rely on strong peer group pressure from
within individual industry sectors to bring laggards on board.
V. What Could Change as a Result of Foreign Direct Liability?
All this said, it remains unclear exactly how foreign direct
liability might change business behaviour. Could it, for example, lead
to multinationals relocating their legal base or their senior
management teams to countries with less onerous legal accountability
mechanisms? This seems unlikely. But the threat of relocation is a
potent political force. In 1998, the Lord Chancellor's Department
(the government department responsible for the administration of
justice in England and Wales) argued in a restricted consultation
letter that exposing multinational companies to actions in the English
courts, which would more appropriately be conducted abroad, could
as a result make them more reluctant to have a presence in England.'
From a corporate responsibility standpoint, at first glance the
most appropriate response to the risk of foreign direct liability is to
ensure that the best possible standards are applied globally - so that
there are no gaps between home and overseas practices to cause
problems in courts at home. But the relationship between emerging
notions of "good" or "best practice" in the corporate citizenship
agenda and the dictates of legal risk management are also challenging
ones for multinational corporate groups to work through. There are

31. Letter from M. Kron, Lord Chancellor's Department (Sept. 15 1998) (on file
with author).
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some potential conflicts. For example, while the corporate citizenship
agenda calls for companies to report openly and transparently on
their impacts, a legal risk management approach to foreign direct
liability may indicate that silence is the safest option. Even so, codes
of conduct and voluntary public reporting on environmental or social
impacts can act as useful internal risk management tools.
Working through the detailed implications of the tension
between legal and corporate responsibility-driven approaches to
managing risk may prove to be one of the most significant challenges
faced by corporate citizenship "campaigners," both within and
outside companies, as the prospect of foreign direct liability begins to
exercise real commercial impact.
For corporate internal
management, the key message may be a procedural one: people
responsible for reporting, human rights, and external stakeholder
engagement may need to spend more time with in-house lawyers, as
well as company secretaries and government relations advisers, to
find an appropriate way forward and to integrate better the different
corporate functions.
Identifying "best practice" can in any case be difficult. There is
currently little civil society consensus on where to draw the
"corporate responsibility" line between direct corporate involvement
in abuses of human rights and complicity in abuses by governments,32
let alone the "legal responsibility" line.
"Best practice" should certainly mean ensuring that subsidiaries
are properly capitalized so that they can invest in equipment and
systems which ensure that workers and environments are not put to
risks that would be considered unacceptable at home. But defining
the content of "best practice" in terms that also amount to a baseline
for foreign direct liability is more difficult to justify when differing
environmental or social standards are the result of deliberate social

32. The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights represent an

initiative that could potentially build understanding of these important "boundary"
issues through a "shared learning" approach. The Principles were agreed upon in
December 2000 by representatives of the governments of the United States and the
United Kingdom, companies in the extractive and energy sectors, and nongovernmental organizations. See Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights,

available

http:llwww.state.gov/www/globalhumanrights/O01220_fsdrl-principles.html

at

(last

visited Aug. 31 2001). For additional discussion of the Voluntary Principles, see

Bennett Freeman, Maria B. Pica & Christopher N. Camponovo, A New Approach to
CorporateResponsibility: The Voluntary Principleson Security and Human Rights, 24
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 423 (2001) (this volume).
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choices on the part of democratically elected host country
governments, rather than a reflection of a need to build better
governance capacity.
The simple claim that multinationals should "apply best practice"
wherever they operate fails to communicate the complexity of the
necessary balances between home and host country priorities and
civil society preoccupations.
Asking home country courts to
contribute to much-needed discussion on the proper balance through
foreign direct liability claims may stretch their capacity since it invites
politically charged decisions,33 but it also offers the promise of making
an important contribution to what remains a difficult task: defining
the boundaries of corporate accountability.
VI. Policy Options for the Future
If foreign direct liability is understood as a way of "joining up"
multinational corporate responsibility across territorial boundaries
and improving corporate environmental and social performance in

developing countries, does it tell us anything about possible public
policy interventions for the future?
One argument is that the cases reveal nothing new about the

governance challenges of administering justice in developing
countries, or the behaviour of a handful of multinational
corporations-behaviour that often fails to match up to today's
notions of "best practice" anyway. In any event, the boundaries of
foreign direct liability are currently by no means clear, and the best
thing for policy-makers to do is to wait and see what emerges from
the current wave of actions.
But this is almost certainly rather too narrow an approach. For
example, the foreign direct liability cases could inform donor policy,
providing new arguments in favour of governance programmes that
target access to justice or strengthen civil society in developing
countries. Plaintiffs should not be forced to litigate in home countries
for lack of access to justice in host countries.
The foreign direct liability cases so far have been based on longstanding legal principles. But an alternative approach would be to
start from scratch to create a tailor-made regime of national "foreign
direct liability" legislation that reflects the state of the art in

33. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102.
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contemporary thinking on corporate responsibility and the role of
multinational corporations in the globalized economy. Australian
Democrat Senator Vicki Bourne's private member's bill, which
passed through the Australian parliamentary committee process prior
to its rejection, aimed to do just this. Her Corporate Code of
Conduct Bill 2000 sought to impose minimum environment,
employment, health and safety and human rights standards on the
conduct of Australian corporations employing more than twenty
persons in a foreign country?4 Elsewhere, too, there is interest in this
kind of legislation. In March 2001, a minister in the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs indicated that his Ministry was interested in
exploring- the scope of legislation to hold Dutch companies
accountable for environmental crimes in other countries, as a logical
next step35 following on from existing legislation on bribery of foreign
officials.
A deeper approach would mean tackling some fundamental
principles of company law. This could mean looking again at the
legal fiction that each company in a corporate group is to be treated
as a separate legal entity, and that the liability of shareholders
(including parent companies) is limited to the amount of unpaid share
capital on their shares. The existence of the doctrine, and the
unwillingness of courts to "raise the veil" of separate legal identity,
are obstacles in efforts to establish principles of group enterprise
liability that recognize the management coordination that exists
within different entities of the same corporate group. So prevalent is
the doctrine that it comes as a surprise to learn that in the United
States, during the period when this fundamental principle became
established, corporations were generally not allowed to acquire and
hold shares of other corporations.36 The notion of limited liability

34. Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000, A Bill for an Act to impose standards

on the conduct of Australian corporations which undertake business activities in
other countries, and for related purposes, Senate Bill No. 00163 (Austl.) (introduced
Sept. 6,2000 by Sen. Vicki Bourne), availableat http://www.aph.gov.au/legis.htm (last
visited Aug. 31, 2001). The Report on the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000 by
the Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities can be
found at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/corp-sec.ctte/reports.htm
(last
visited Sept. 26, 2001).
35. Speech van de staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, drs. G. Ybema,
Tweede Nationaal Sustainability Congres, Bussum, 13 maart 2001, available at
http://info.minez.nlhome.asp?page=/Speeches/Speeches200l20002O.htm
(last
visited Aug. 31 2001) (author's paraphrased translation).
36. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO
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evolved in the mid-nineteenth century largely as a means of fostering
the capital investment that was increasingly needed to sustain
technological innovation. But evidence from Massachusetts and
Rhode Island during the 1820s (the American states with the most
intense manufacturing activity at the time when the notion of limited
liability was taking hold elsewhere) appears to counter the suggestion
that limited liability is essential to foster commercial activity.37
Limited liability forces plaintiffs in "foreign direct liability" cases
to focus on acts or omissions of parent companies, rather than seeking
to "raise the corporate veil." But this emphasis on parent companies
effectively limits the potential for legal accountability to those
corporate groups that operate under a vertically hierarchical
management structure. In more complex management structures,
including effectively polycentric corporations, it is even more difficult
to match existing legal principles of negligence to the reality of
control. It remains to be seen, even in the international law-focused
Alien Tort Claims Act cases, just what boundaries courts will set on
the extent of parent company acts or omissions, or the knowledge
necessary to secure legal responsibility for injuries suffered by
workers.
Because multinational corporations, by their very nature, are
able to coordinate above and beyond the boundaries of territorial
sovereignty, it is tempting to argue that an internationally
coordinated approach may be the most appropriate way to ensure
that regulation, whether "soft" or "hard," is capable of providing an
effective normative framework for multinational corporate activity.
Intergovernmental agencies have recently been active in developing
voluntary codes of conduct for companies, not limited to
multinationals. In January 1999, Kofi Annan launched the United
Nations Global Compact, based on nine very general "universal"
principles for business. June 2000 saw the adoption of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (which, despite its name, is
not limited to multinational enterprises).39 These codes, alongside

non-governmental

initiatives such as the Permanent Peoples'

(1993).
37. Id. at 13.
38. See generally http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Aug. 31,2001).
39. See generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development:
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, June 27, 2000, reprintedin 40 I.L.M.
237 (adopted by the governments of the twenty-nine OECD member countries and
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the Slovak Republic).
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Tribunal, ' can help to build consensus around expectations of
corporate behaviour and its possible connection with legal norms.
But they do not currently provide a framework for allocating
compensation to injured workers or impacted communities, and their
general principles fall far short of what would be required of a
comprehensive legal risk management toolkit.41
Today's corporate citizenship campaign agenda also incorporates
a potent call to develop globally applicable, legally enforceable,
minimum standards for multinational corporations. Codes of conduct
may themselves be understood as an evolutionary step along the way
to legally binding standards that carry the support of a responsible
majority while ensuring censure and accountability of wrongdoing
companies, which are not susceptible to the potential force of naming

and shaming initiatives that do not carry the force of law. For
example, in relation to the U.N. Global Compact, Kenneth Roth,
Executive Director of the NGO Human Rights Watch, stated to U.N.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan in July 2000 that:
We... hope that the Compact is seen not as an end in itself but as a
first step toward promoting a binding legal regime for corporate
conduct, and that this regime is backed by an effective enforcement
mechanism. Developing such binding standards and enforcement
mechanisms would be consistent with a role that the UN

traditionally has played in other areas.4z

International criminal law is likely to evolve rapidly once the new
international criminal court has been established. Though the court's
statute does not allow for corporate liability, 43 this could still evolve at
40. The Permanent Peoples' Tribunal was established in 1979 as a forum for

work in the field of the "law for the rights of peoples." Lelio Basso Int'l Found. for
the Rights and Liberation of Peoples, Permanent Peoples' Tribunal, available at
http:llwww.grisnet.it/filb/tribu%20eng.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2001). The Tribunal
holds inquiries before members of a jury who apply "law" based on "the
requirements and exigencies of peoples," and issue judgments. Id. Work includes
inquiries into the Bhopal disaster and the relationship between global corporations
and human wrongs. Id.
41. Even the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (which
specifically address risk assessment and corporate relations with state and private
security forces - issues that are at stake in many of the foreign direct liability cases)
fall far short of offering guidelines that could reasonably be understood as a legal risk
management tool. See supra note 32.
42. Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to
Kofi Annan, Secretary General, United Nations (July 28, 2000), available at
http://www.hrw.orgladvocacy/corporations/index.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).
43. Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 25, U.N. Doe.
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the national level. As Professor Clapham argues, the Nuremberg
trials opened the possibility that over time, national courts could be
asked to hold corporations criminally accountable under principles of
international criminal law.'
A dedicated "global foreign direct liability convention" could
reduce the potential economically driven incentive for countries to
legislate against the emergence of foreign direct liability under
common law principles. It could also avoid the foreign policy
tensions that can arise when courts stretch existing legal principles to
meet new demands. Specific international civil liability regimes
already exist in some areas where the potential for transboundary
impacts (and therefore state liability under international law) is high,
such as pollution by oil or radioactivity. A separate regime exists for
damage caused by space objects. Each has the effect of channelling
liability to private actors, avoiding the need for inter-state litigation.
Building the political will for a global foreign direct liability
convention would be no easy task. What is needed essentially is a
contemporary understanding of home and host country
responsibilities. Traditional notions of territorial sovereignty, rigidly
adhered to, are inadequate because they fail to recognize the
economic reality of multinational corporations in the globalized
economy.
A huge range of international agreements are now in place that
are motivated by a concern to tackle issues of moral concern to
humankind. It would be a relatively small step conceptually to join
the environmental liability conventions to the body of human rights
and labour law by seeking to recognize the justification for
international action and internationally coordinated liability in cases
of egregious transnational corporate abuse of people or environments
in developing countries.
In any suggestions for change, it is important that means and
ends are matched. A focus on developing the best possible means of
securing access to justice for ordinary citizens of developing countries
may not lead to foreign direct liability as a first best solution.45 If the
AICONF.18319, reprintedin 37 I.L.M. 999, 1016.
44. See Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in
Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 339 (2001) (this volume).
45. See, e.g., Peter Newell, Access to Environmental Justice? Litigation against
TNCs in the South, in MAKING LAW MATTER: RULES, RIGHTS AND SECURITY AND

THE LIVES OF THE POOR, 32 I.D.S. BULL. 83 (Richard Crook & Peter Houtzager eds.,
2001). Newell points out that transnational litigation is not a sustainable and realistic
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principal aim is to ensure that the economic rights of multinationals
are matched by new responsibilities, that may suggest a different
course of action-for example, ensuring that human rights and social
and environmental considerations are explicitly integrated within
future efforts to liberalise investment. If the aim is to view
multinational corporations as one actor among others in overall
efforts to secure the global public good of sustainable development,
that may again produce a different set of results. Even if all
businesses entities all around the world were to adopt "best practice,"
the result would not be sustainable development or universal
compliance with human rights. It is important at this stage in the
evolution of the corporate responsibility agenda not to lose sight of
that fact amid escalating expectations of voluntary corporate
responsibility.
What of the increasing number of multinational corporations
operating in sensitive sectors such as forestry or mining that are
headquartered in developing rather than developed countries? If
new laws are intended to respond to perceptions of the enhanced
power of the multinationals themselves, then they should ultimately
address all multinational corporations, not only those headquartered
in developed countries. The implication of any legislation targeted
specifically at multinationals could be that foreign direct investors
should adhere to higher standards of practice than domestic
companies-something inherently at odds with the notion of
"national treatment" that lies at the heart of most trade and
investment liberalisation. But if the concern is to ensure that
companies respect fundamental human rights, there is little
justification (other than as a matter of strategy) for limiting any new
approaches to multinational corporations. Even a policy starting
point that views the problem to be resolved as the political power of
multinationals could lead to more sophisticated dividing lines than
"multinational" or "domestic."
Analysis of the evolutionary development of principles of
international law and their application to companies is just one entry
point among many for efforts to understand how to secure corporate
accountability and responsible corporate behaviour-corporate
citizenship-in ways that reflect the contemporary reality of relations
between governance, economic activity, and social and environmental
strategy for many communities, and that it does nothing to build up the capacity of
legal systems in the South.
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impacts. Taking "foreign direct liability" as an entry point reveals
many of the existing obstacles to securing this goal through home
country courts. The legal issues divide between "home" and "host"
countries, between "state" and "private" actors, between
"multinational" and "domestic" companies, and between "parent"
and "subsidiary."
The twenty-first century corporate citizenship agenda needs to
develop in a way that offers space to begin some serious discussions
on whether some of today's dividing lines should continue to be
accorded the legal significance that they have acquired thus far.
Responsible corporate behaviour should be rewarded. But real
changes are also required to ensure that the most egregious violations
of human rights and gross environmental pollution are ultimately
capable of being addressed through effective, accessible, legally
binding mechanisms that offer meaningful compensation and
effective disincentives to recurrence.

